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I. INTRODUCTION 
As of July 22, 2004, almost one billion illegal downloads oc-
curred every month, and over ninety-seven percent of files shared 
over peer-to-peer networks were shared illegally.1  On June 27, 2005, 
the United States Supreme Court created liability for inducing in-
fringement of a copyright, a step many hope will help halt this Inter-
net piracy.2  Mass peer-to-peer file-sharing began with Napster, a net-
work that enabled users to directly swap music files over the Internet.3  
As the number of Napster users increased, the network began to 
negatively impact record sales.4  The music industry took action by fil-
ing suit against Napster, and the Ninth Circuit eventually held Nap-
ster liable for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.5  In 
June 2002, Napster filed for bankruptcy and, although the Napster 
name remains, the company that started peer-to-peer file-sharing no 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. (English), 
2001, Providence College. 
 1 See Protecting Innovation and Art While Preventing Piracy: Hearings on S. 2560 Before 
the S. Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearings], available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1276&wit_id=3753 (testimony of Mr. 
Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO of the Recording Industry Association of Amer-
ica); but see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. 
REV. 975, 1023–29 (2002) (discussing file-sharing as a fair use and therefore, not ille-
gal). 
 2 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 125 S. Ct. 
2764, 2770 (2005). 
 3 Michael W. Carroll, Disruptive Technology and Common Law Lawmaking: A Brief 
Analysis of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 5, 12 (2002). 
 4 Id. at 13; but see Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File 
Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis 1 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished manu-
script, http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing_March2004.pdf) (claiming 
that peer-to-peer file-sharing is having almost no effect on record sales). 
 5 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004, 1022, 1024 (9th 
Cir. 2001); see also infra notes 76–89 and accompanying text. 
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longer exists.6  Shutting down Napster was a major victory for the en-
tertainment industry, but, by that time, peer-to-peer file-sharing was 
prospering, and the music industry was already losing money.7 
The Ninth Circuit established in A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, 
Inc.8 that operators of peer-to-peer file-sharing networks could be 
held liable for copyright infringement9 under theories of contribu-
tory and vicarious liability.10  After the fall of Napster, other peer-to-
peer file-sharing network operators tried to structure their networks 
in a way that they thought insulated them from liability.11  This at-
tempt appeared successful after the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California, in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. 
v. Grokster, Ltd.,12 held that Grokster and StreamCast, which operated 
networks with less operator control over their respective users than 
Napster, could not be held liable as contributory or vicarious infring-
ers.13  The Ninth Circuit later affirmed the district court’s decision in 
Grokster.14  While waiting for the Supreme Court’s decision on 
whether or not to grant certiorari in Grokster, and with the current 
doctrines of secondary copyright infringement seeming ineffective in 
combating the mass infringement that occurred daily across peer-to-
peer networks, the entertainment industry sought a new remedy.15 
At the urging of copyright owners,16 several senators introduced 
the “Inducing Infringement of Copyright Act of 2004.”17  This bill 
 
 6 Chuck Squatriglia, Napster History Sold for a Song: Scores Attend, Hundreds Log on 
to Bankruptcy Auction in Santa Clara, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 12, 2002, at A25, available at 
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2002/12/12/BA71576.DTL. The 
name Napster still exists because Roxio, a digital media company, bought it.  Id. 
 7 Carroll, supra note 3, at 13. 
 8 Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004. 
 9 A plaintiff alleging copyright infringement must establish two elements: “(1) 
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work 
that are original.”  MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§13.01 (64th ed. 2004). 
 10 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022, 1024; see also infra Part II.C. 
 11 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 259 F. 
Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 
125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); see also infra Part II.D (explaining that the structure of newer 
peer-to-peer technology prevents the company from maintaining control, which is a 
necessary component for finding liability). 
 12 Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029. 
 13 Id. at 1031. 
 14 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. (Grokster II), 380 F.3d 1154, 
1157 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
 15 See infra Part II.E (discussing the Inducing Infringement of Copyright Act of 
2004, which could broaden secondary liability for copyright infringement). 
 16 Marilyn Geewax, Tech, Electronics Firms Fear Copyright Bill Could Target Them, COX 
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 29, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library. 
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would have made it possible to hold anyone who induces the in-
fringement of a copyright liable as an infringer.18  The bill, based 
upon the section of the Patent Act19 dealing with inducing infringe-
ment,20 was specifically intended to prevent peer-to-peer file-sharing 
networks from profiting from infringement.21  The session of Con-
gress ended without any further action on the bill, and it was never 
reintroduced.22  On June 27, 2005, the Supreme Court adopted the 
idea of applying the patent law concept of inducing infringement to 
copyright law when it published its opinion on Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.23  A unanimous Court concluded that a distributor 
of a product that enables another party to infringe a copyright could 
be liable for the infringement of that copyright under the theory of 
inducing infringement.24 
This Comment addresses the Supreme Court’s decision in Grok-
ster and how the lower courts should apply it.  Part II of this Comment 
discusses the history of secondary liability in copyright law and how 
the legislature and judiciary have dealt with innovation.  Part III fo-
cuses upon the concerns arising out of the Supreme Court’s decision.  
Part IV examines how an interpretation of this decision in light of es-
tablished principles in patent law ameliorate the concerns and ap-
parent uncertainties caused by the decision. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Copyright and Patent Law 
Federal copyright and patent laws are based on Article 1, Section 
8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution.25  Copyright law pro-
tects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly 
 
 17 S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2000). 
 20 Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1276&wit_id=2629. 
 21 See David Kassabian, Bill Proposed to Strengthen Copyright Laws, DAILY TEXAN, Aug. 
2, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library, University Wire File. 
 22 Art Brodsky, Induce Act Blog, http://techlawadvisor.com/induce/2004/10/ 
induce-dead.html (Oct. 7, 2004). 
 23 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 125 S. Ct. 
2764 (2005). 
 24 Id. at 2780. 
 25 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
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or with the aid of a machine or device.”26  Patent law protects “any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,”27 for which a 
patent has been issued. 
i. Direct Infringement 
Both copyright and patent law provide protection to owners 
from infringement by others.  A copyright is directly infringed when 
another party violates any of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights to 
reproduce, prepare a derivative work, distribute copies, display pub-
licly, perform publicly, or perform publicly by means of a digital au-
dio transmission.28  Direct infringement of a patent occurs when 
“whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any pat-
ented invention, within the United States or imports into the United 
States any patented invention during the term of the patent there-
for.”29  Both copyright owners and patent owners can protect them-
selves by suing the alleged infringer;30 however, patent cases may only 
be appealed in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,31 whereas 
copyright cases can be appealed in any circuit.32 
ii. Secondary Liability for Infringement 
Prior to Grokster, two forms of secondary liability for infringe-
ment existed in copyright law: vicarious liability and contributory li-
 
 26 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 27 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 28 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
 29 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
 30 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.01 (101st ed. 2005); NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 9, at § 12.02. 
 31 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final decision of a district 
court of the United States, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of the Canal Zone, the District of Guam, the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands, or the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, 
if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part on sec-
tion 1338 of this title, except that a case involving a claim arising under 
any Act of Congress relating to copyrights, exclusive rights in mask 
works, or trademarks and no other claims under section 1338(a) shall 
be governed by sections 1291, 1292, and 1294 of this title. 
Id. 
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) states: “The district courts shall have original juris-
diction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant 
variety protection, copyrights and trademarks.  Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of 
the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.” 
 32 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000). 
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ability.33  Although the Copyright Act34 is quite extensive, there are no 
statutory provisions that relate to secondary liability.35  While vicarious 
and contributory liability are different forms of secondary liability, 
both require a finding of direct infringement by a third party.36 
Vicarious liability is a creature of the common law, derived from 
the principles of respondeat superior.37  The Second Circuit first ap-
plied the current concept of vicarious liability in Shapiro, Bernstein & 
Co., Inc. v. H.L. Green Co., Inc.,38 as a means of holding the owner of a 
chain of department stores liable for the sale of counterfeit records 
by a concessionaire.39  The Second Circuit reiterated the test estab-
lished in Shapiro, in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Man-
agement, Inc.,40 holding that an individual is vicariously liable for copy-
right infringement by a third party “if he has the right and ability to 
supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest 
in such activities.”41  Every circuit has adopted this test as a means of 
determining when a party can be held vicariously liable.42 
The other means of allocating secondary liability for infringe-
ment of copyrights is contributory liability.43  Contributory liability, 
 
 33 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, §12.04[A]. 
 34 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2000). 
 35 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, §12.04[A]. 
 36 Id. § 12.04[A][3][a]. 
 37 See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261–62 (9th Cir. 1996).  
In Fonovisa, the court imposed secondary liability against the owners of a swap meet 
for the infringements of both copyrights and trademarks.  Id. at 260.  The case pro-
vides a clear example of the applications of both vicarious and contributory liabili-
ties.  Id. at 261.  Respondeat superior is defined as “[t]he doctrine holding an em-
ployer or principal liable for the employee’s or agent’s wrongful acts committed 
within the scope of the employment or agency.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th 
ed. 2004). 
 38 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963). 
 39 Id. at 305. 
 40 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 41 Id. at 1162. 
 42 See, e.g., Gordon v. Nextel Commc’ns, 345 F.3d 922, 925 (6th Cir. 2003); Nel-
son-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 513 (4th Cir. 2002); Fono-
visa, 76 F.3d at 262; RCA/Ariola Int’l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 
781 (8th Cir. 1988); Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162; Goes Litho. Co. v. Banta Corp., 26 F. 
Supp. 2d 1042, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Polygram Int’l Publ’g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 
855 F. Supp. 1314, 1324 (D. Mass. 1994); Songmaker v. Forward of Kan., Inc., No. 90-
4156-SAC, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4392, at *16 (D. Kan. Mar. 5, 1993); Chi-Boy Music 
v. Towne Tavern, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 527, 530 (E.D. Ala. 1991); A & N Music Corp. v. 
Venezia, 733 F. Supp. 955, 957 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Golden Torch Music Corp. v. 
Lichelle’s, Inc., No. W-86-CA-005, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7634, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 
26, 1987).  For a more complete history of the inception of vicarious liability in copy-
right law, see Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1324–28. 
 43 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 12.04[A]. 
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like vicarious liability, is not statutory, but has its roots in tort law.44  
The Second Circuit established the idea that “one who, with knowl-
edge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contrib-
utes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 
‘contributory’ infringer.”45  This test for contributory infringement is 
used in all the circuits.46 
Patent law has two statutory provisions concerning secondary li-
ability for infringement.47  The Patent Act of 1952 codified the com-
mon law concept of contributory infringement and divided it into 
two categories: contributory infringement and inducing infringe-
ment.48  Section  271(c) of the Patent Act covers contributory in-
fringement and states: 
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports 
into the United States a component of a patented machine, 
manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or appa-
ratus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a ma-
terial part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially 
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such 
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suit-
able for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a con-
tributory infringer.49 
The other provision, § 271(b), governs inducement of infringement 
of a patent and states “whoever actively induces infringement of a 
patent shall be liable as an infringer.”50 
 
 44 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. 
 45 Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162. 
 46 See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Rhyme Syndicate Music, 376 F.3d 615, 621 
(6th Cir. 2004); CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 
2004); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 
2001); Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987); Columbia Pictures In-
dus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 1984); Harris v. Thomas, 
No. 02-0518, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23103, at *7 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2004); Microsoft 
Corp. v. V3 Solutions, Inc., No. 01 C 4693, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15008, at *39 (N.D. 
Ill. Aug. 27, 2003); Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1333; Feder v. Videotrip Corp., 697 F. 
Supp. 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 1988); Johnson v. Salomon, No. 4-73 Civ 536, 1977 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 15735, at *105 (D. Minn. May 25, 1977). 
 47 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2000). 
 48 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
 49 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 
 50 Id. § 271(b). 
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B. The Sony Decision 
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,51 a major 
1984 decision regarding copyright infringement and new technology, 
the Supreme Court clarified the application of secondary liability.52  
The Court addressed whether or not Sony, the manufacturer of Be-
tamax Video Tape Recorders (VTRs), could be held secondarily li-
able for infringement committed by its users.53  In the late 1970s, 
Sony invented VTRs which allowed consumers to transfer current 
television programming onto videotape.54  Some of the owners of the 
programs that were recorded felt their copyrights were being in-
fringed.55  These owners brought suit against Sony in an attempt to 
enjoin any further manufacturing or marketing of the product, and 
to obtain damages.56  Since Sony itself was not infringing any copy-
rights, the action was brought under the theory of secondary liabil-
ity.57  The United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia denied the plaintiffs any relief,58 but the Ninth Circuit reversed 
this decision and held Sony liable as a contributory infringer.59  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and overturned the decision of the 
Ninth Circuit.60 
The Supreme Court only addressed the theory of contributory 
infringement,61 under which the Ninth Circuit found Sony liable.62  
The Supreme Court observed that the only way it could hold Sony li-
able was if “they [had] sold equipment with constructive knowledge 
of the fact that their customers may use that equipment to make un-
authorized copies of copyrighted material.”63  No precedent for this 
existed in copyright law.64  Since there is a relationship between copy-
right law and patent law65 the Supreme Court looked to patent law, 
 
 51 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 52 Id. at 442. 
 53 Id. at 420. 
 54 Id. at 422. 
 55 Id. at 420. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Sony, 464 U.S. at 419. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 420, 456. 
 60 Id. at 456. 
 61 See id. at 436. 
 62 Id. at 420. 
 63 Sony, 464 U.S. at 439. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
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which statutorily addressed contributory negligence.66  In 35 U.S.C. § 
271(c), the portion of the Patent Code dedicated to contributory in-
fringement,67 the Supreme Court extracted the concept that “sale of a 
‘staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use’ is not contributory infringement.”68  The Supreme 
Court acknowledged that there are many differences between the 
Patent Code and the laws of Copyright but the Supreme Court held 
that “the staple article of commerce doctrine,” embodied in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(c) serves an important purpose in patent law and could serve 
an equally as important purpose in copyright law.69 
The Supreme Court adopted a new limitation on contributory 
infringement in copyright law by declaring that “the sale of copying 
equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not con-
stitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for le-
gitimate, unobjectionable purposes.  Indeed, it need merely be capa-
ble of substantial noninfringing uses.”70  The Supreme Court applied 
this limitation and determined that since the Betamax VTR was capa-
ble of substantial noninfringing uses, Sony could not be held liable as 
a contributory infringer.71 
C. Napster 
As time went by, consumers’ means of copying advanced.  In the 
late 1990s, Napster introduced the public to peer-to-peer file-sharing, 
thereby allowing users to directly connect to other users’ hard drives 
and download copies of other users’ files directly onto their own hard 
drives.72  The majority of the files shared over Napster were unauthor-
ized copies of copyrighted music files, enabling millions of users to 
become copyright infringers.73  The record companies feared that this 
mass infringement, due to the ability of Napster’s users to download 
free music from the Internet, would result in a decline in record sales 
and a tremendous loss of profit.74  This fear drove members of the re-
cord industry to file suit against Napster, claiming both contributory 
 
 66 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Sony, 464 U.S. at 440 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271). 
 69 Id. at 442. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 456. 
 72 See Carroll, supra note 3, at 11–12. 
 73 Id. at 13. 
 74 Id. 
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and vicarious liability for copyright infringement.75  The United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California granted an in-
junction in favor of the record companies, but the Ninth Circuit 
temporarily stayed the preliminary injunction until hearing the ap-
peal.76 
On appeal the Ninth Circuit addressed the extent of Napster’s 
liability for the copyright infringement of its customers under the 
theories of vicarious and contributory infringement.77  Since direct 
infringement is required for any finding of secondary infringement,78 
the court first affirmed the district court’s decision that the users 
were direct infringers because they made unauthorized copies of 
copyrighted works.79  The Ninth Circuit next applied the Gershwin 
“contributory” infringement test, noting that “one who, with knowl-
edge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contrib-
utes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 
contributory infringer.”80  The court immediately rejected Napster’s 
contention that the exception created in Sony precluded Napster 
from liability as a contributory infringer because Napster was capable 
of substantial noninfringing use.81  In so doing, the Ninth Circuit in-
terpreted the Sony exception as a factor used to establish a higher 
level of knowledge necessary for finding liability, not as a bar to liabil-
ity.82  The court found this knowledge requirement satisfied, despite 
the fact that Napster was capable of noninfringing use because “Nap-
ster ha[d] actual knowledge that specific infringing material [was] 
available using its system, that it could block access to the system by 
suppliers of the infringing material, and that it failed to remove the 
material.”83  The Ninth Circuit also found that Napster materially 
contributed to the infringing activities of its users because it supplied 
 
 75 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster I), 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 76 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
 77 Id. 
 78 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 12.04[A][3][a]. 
 79 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1014–19.  The Ninth Circuit dismissed Napster’s al-
leged defense of fair use because the purpose and character of the use was commer-
cial, the copyrighted works were creative in nature, the whole work was copied, and 
the market was harmed by the use.  Id. 
 80 Id. at 1019 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 
443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
 81 Id. at 1020. 
 82 See id. at 1020–21. 
 83 Id. at 1022. 
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the software and the central server, thereby providing “the site and 
facilities” allowing the users to directly infringe.84 
The Ninth Circuit next addressed vicarious liability—specifically 
whether or not Napster “ha[d] the right and ability to supervise the 
infringing activity and also ha[d] a direct financial interest in such ac-
tivities.”85  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determina-
tion that Napster financially benefited from the fact that the number 
of copyrighted works available on its system increased directly with 
the number of registered users on its system.86  The Ninth Circuit also 
affirmed the district court’s determination that Napster had the abil-
ity to block certain users’ access to the system, and to police for in-
fringement, despite the inability to read the content of the files being 
transferred. 87  This supported the conclusion that Napster could su-
pervise for infringement.88  The court concluded that “Napster’s fail-
ure to police the system’s ‘premises’ combined with a showing that 
Napster financially benefit[ed] from the continuing availability of in-
fringing files on its system, leads to the imposition of vicarious liabil-
ity.”89  Although Napster attempted to remain in operation while 
complying with the orders of the court, it was unable to survive and 
filed for bankruptcy in June 2002.90 
D. The Next Generation of Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing Networks 
As secondary liability in copyright law developed, so did peer-to-
peer technology, and although Napster disappeared as a means of 
obtaining free copyrighted files, new peer-to-peer networks arose.91  
Many of these networks used knowledge gained from the Napster de-
cision concerning which features made Napster liable for contribu-
tory and secondary infringement to avoid similar fates.92  In April 
2003, the United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia determined that some peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, 
 
 84 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 
F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 85 Id. (quoting Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162). 
 86 Id. at 1023. This was a tenuous argument because Napster was actually not 
earning money.  See Carroll, supra note 3, at 25.  The only money coming in was in-
vestment capital, but the court equated the size of the user base with the amount of 
money Napster would be able to make in the future.  Id. 
 87 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1024. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 1023–24. 
 90 See Squatriglia, supra note 6. 
 91 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. (Grokster II), 380 F.3d 
1154, 1158–60 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
 92 Id. 
KEEGAN FINAL.DOC 3/7/2006  4:31:03 PM 
2006] COMMENT 1025 
namely Grokster and StreamCast, were not liable for either contribu-
tory infringement or vicarious infringement of copyrights.93  On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision.94  Although all peer-to-
peer networks allow their users to download copies of copyrighted 
works, the court found that there were certain differences between 
Napster and the Grokster and StreamCast systems that insulated 
Grokster and StreamCast from both contributory and vicarious liabil-
ity.  The district court acknowledged that “[d]efendants may have in-
tentionally structured their businesses to avoid secondary liability for 
copyright infringement, while benefiting financially from the illicit 
draw of their wares,” but whether it was intentional or not, these peer-
to-peer networks fell outside the scope of the law for secondary liabil-
ity.95 
The Ninth Circuit first established the distinguishing features of 
these peer-to-peer networks.96  The essential difference between a 
secondarily liable network and an immune network was the location 
of the indices of the files that were available for download.97  The 
Napster network was liable as a contributory and vicarious infringer 
because it stored the information on Napster’s own servers.98  In con-
trast, the network used by Grokster used individual users’ computers 
to store the system’s indices,99 while StreamCast used a network that 
was completely decentralized and allowed users to directly search the 
files available on fellow users’ computers. 100  Without a central server 
with an index of all the files available for download, there was noth-
ing for StreamCast to own or operate.101  This lack of physical control 
over the servers distinguishes the Grokster and StreamCast networks 
from Napster.102 
The Ninth Circuit next examined how this distinction affected 
these peer-to-peer file-sharing networks’ liability as contributory and 
vicarious infringers.103  In addressing whether or not there was con-
 
 93 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 259 F. Supp. 
2d 1029, 1035–46 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 
S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
 94 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1157. 
 95 Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1046. 
 96 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1158–59. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 1159. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1159. 
 103 Id. at 1160. 
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tributory infringement, the Ninth Circuit recognized there was no 
dispute over the fact that there was direct infringement.104  Turning 
toward the knowledge requirement, the court stated how the Sony de-
cision impacted the knowledge requirement of Napster: 
If the product at issue is not capable of substantial or commer-
cially significant noninfringing uses, then the copyright owner 
need only show that the defendant had constructive knowledge of 
the infringement.  On the other hand, if the product at issue is 
capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing 
uses, then the copyright owner must demonstrate that the defen-
dant had reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files and 
failed to act on that knowledge to prevent infringement.105 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court was correct in its 
determination that each defendant’s product was capable of substan-
tial noninfringing uses.106  Therefore, the copyright holders must 
show that Grokster and StreamCast had reasonable knowledge of the 
direct infringement committed by their users.107  The Ninth Circuit 
also affirmed the district court’s finding that in order to fulfill the 
knowledge requirement, Grokster and StreamCast must have known 
about the infringement when they were in a position to stop it.108  
Since they both utilized decentralized indexing networks, which 
could function without any support from either Grokster or Stream-
Cast, once the companies learned of the infringement they no longer 
had control over the system.109  Since they were not in a position to 
stop the infringement once they learned of it, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the higher standard of knowledge was not met.110 
The Ninth Circuit next addressed whether or not the conduct of 
Grokster and StreamCast qualified as materially contributing to the 
infringement of their users.111  In Napster, the Ninth Circuit found a 
material contribution because Napster provided the “site and facili-
ties” for infringement by providing centralized indices.  Since neither 
 
 104 Id.  At the district court level, both parties stipulated to the plaintiffs’ owner-
ships of the copyrights.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster 
I), 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), 
vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).  The court considered that users of the service 
download copyrighted music and infringe the copyright owner’s right to reproduc-
tion to be uncontroverted facts.  Id. 
 105 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1161. 
 106 Id. at 1161–62. 
 107 Id. at 1162. 
 108 Id. at 1162–63. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 1162. 
 111 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163. 
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Grokster nor StreamCast provided centralized servers, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found they did not materially contribute to the infringement.112 
Once the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that 
there was no contributory infringement, the Ninth Circuit considered 
whether or not there had been vicarious infringement.113  Since the 
presence of the elements of direct infringement and financial benefit 
were not disputed,114 the only element necessary for vicarious in-
fringement that the court addressed was the “right and ability to su-
pervise.”115  The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court in its 
finding that neither Grokster nor StreamCast had the right and abil-
ity to supervise their users’ direct infringement.116  In Napster, the 
court found that Napster had a right and ability to supervise “because 
it controlled the central indices of files, users were required to regis-
ter with Napster, and access to the system depended on the validity of 
a user’s registration.”117  Neither Grokster nor StreamCast had a cen-
tral indexing system, required their users to register, or maintained 
any control over whether or not any particular user had access to the 
system.118  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded, unlike Napster, 
neither Grokster nor StreamCast had the right and ability to super-
vise.119  Since this requirement for vicarious copyright infringement 
was not present, the Ninth Circuit determined that Grokster and 
StreamCast were not liable as vicarious infringers.120  The Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded its opinion with a reminder that it is not the court’s 
job to alter the law in the area of copyright, rather, that should be left 
to Congress.121 
E. The Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004 
In June of 2004, Congress attempted to alter the law of copy-
right.  Senators Orrin Hatch, Patrick Leahy, Bill Frist, Tom Daschle, 
Lindsey Graham and Barbara Boxer introduced an amendment to 
the Copyright Act, entitled “Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act 
of 2004.”122  The Senators wanted to hold liable as an infringer any-
 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 1164. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1165. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 See id. at 1164–66. 
 121 Id. at 1167. 
 122 S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004). 
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one who intentionally induced another to infringe a copyright.123  On 
July 22, 2004, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on 
“Protecting Innovation and Art while Preventing Piracy,” to discuss 
the proposed legislation.124  Although the proposed bill received im-
mense support from the Recording Industry Association of America 
and other copyright holders, it met stiff opposition from fair use 
groups, prompting Hatch and Leahy to request alternate drafts.125  
The bill was scheduled for mark-up126 several times, but it was con-
tinually postponed in an effort to get all sides to agree on a proposed 
draft.  After intense negotiation, the talks ceased on October 7, 2004, 
and the session of Congress ended without the bill passing.127  Despite 
this failure, Senator Hatch announced plans to reintroduce the bill. 
F. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 
A reintroduction of the Induce Act became unnecessary on June 
27, 2005 when the Supreme Court delivered a unanimous decision in 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.128  The Supreme Court 
overturned the Ninth Circuit’s holding that Grokster and StreamCast 
were not secondarily liable for copyright infringement committed by 
users.129  While such a determination would be extremely important 
to both copyright holders and innovators under any circumstances, 
the magnitude of this opinion lies in the fact that the Supreme Court 
created liability for inducing infringement of a copyright.130  In the 
opinion, Justice Souter stated: “[w]e adopt [the inducement rule of 
patent law] here, holding that one who distributes a device with the 
 
 123 Id. 
 124 Hearings, supra note 1, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id 
=1276&wit_id=2629. 
 125 Patrick Ross, Fair Use Groups Offer Alternative to Inducement Bill, CONSUMER 
ELECTRONICS DAILY, Aug. 26, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library. 
 126 Markup is defined as “[a] session of a congressional committee during which a 
bill is revised and put into final form before it is reported to the appropriate house.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 992 (8th ed. 2004). 
 127 See Brodsky, supra note 22. 
 128 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 125 S. Ct. 
2764 (2005).  Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the court, while Justice Gins-
berg filed a concurrence which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined.  
Id. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  In addition, Justice Breyer filed a separate 
concurrence which Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor joined.  Id. at 2787 (Breyer, 
J., concurring).    The concurrences address the status of the Sony doctrine which Jus-
tice Souter felt was unnecessary to the Court’s holding in the case.  Id. at 2778 (ma-
jority opinion). 
 129 Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2783. 
 130 Id. at 2780. 
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object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear 
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is 
liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”131 
Justice Souter began the decision by establishing that “one who 
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe a 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps 
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of in-
fringement by third parties.”132  The first portion of the opinion estab-
lished the background.  Justice Souter initially described the technol-
ogy behind Grokster and StreamCast, which was critical to the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision.133  Justice Souter next recounted the activities of 
Grokster and StreamCast immediately following the downfall of Nap-
ster, and the steps each network took to attract Napster’s users 
searching for a new way to download copyrighted songs for free.134  
Justice Souter considered the activities of both peer-to-peer networks 
as evidence of an intention to create software to illegally download 
copyrighted works.135  Finally, Justice Souter recounted how both the 
district court and the Ninth Circuit found Grokster and StreamCast 
not liable for the infringement of their users.136  Justice Souter recog-
nized that this was a case about the tension between copyright protec-
tion and promoting innovation, and that the argument for imposing 
secondary liability is powerful.137 
Since the Sony decision was the most recent time the Supreme 
Court addressed secondary liability for copyright infringement, and it 
was that case upon which MGM based its claim, Justice Souter found 
it necessary to recount that earlier holding.  He stated that in Sony the 
“Court addressed a claim that secondary liability for infringement can 
arise from the very distribution of a commercial product.”138  Justice 
Souter explained the VCR technology that was at issue and stated that 
the only way to impose liability was through Sony’s knowledge that 
some customers would infringe.139  In Sony the Court adopted the sta-
ple-article of commerce doctrine which in application, “absolves the 
equivocal conduct of selling an item with substantial lawful as well as 
unlawful uses, and limits liability to instances of more acute fault than 
 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 2770. 
 133 Id. at 2770–71. 
 134 Id. at 2772–74. 
 135 Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2774. 
 136 Id. at 2774–75. 
 137 Id. at 2775. 
 138 Id. at 2777. 
 139 Id. 
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the mere understanding that some of one’s products will be mis-
used.”140  Justice Souter agreed with MGM that the Ninth Circuit mis-
applied this holding by reading the rule too broadly and concluding 
that being capable of substantial noninfringing use insulates the pro-
ducer from liability “even when an actual purpose to cause infringing 
use is shown by evidence independent of design and distribution of 
the product, unless the distributors had ‘specific knowledge of in-
fringement at a time at which they contributed to the infringement, 
and failed to act upon that information.’”141 
Justice Souter found it sufficient to note that the lower courts 
misapplied Sony, and declined to delineate a specific point at which 
noninfringing use is no longer considered substantial, therefore trig-
gering liability.142  Justice Souter declared that the pertinent rule in 
Sony was the limitation it placed upon a court’s ability to impute in-
tent for secondary liability solely from the characteristics of a prod-
uct.  He believed, in the current case, there was no need to impute 
intent solely from the characteristics of a product, and declared 
“where evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or the 
knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements 
or actions directed to promoting infringement, Sony’s staple-article 
rule will not preclude liability.”143 
Justice Souter proceeded to explain the concept of liability for 
inducing infringement as it exists in patent law, and how intent to 
encourage infringement may be demonstrated through active steps 
“such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in 
an infringing use.”144  Justice Souter stated that “[f]or the same rea-
sons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a model 
for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensi-
ble one for copyright.”145  Justice Souter further explained this rule by 
stating that “mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual in-
fringing uses would not be enough to subject a distributor to liabil-
ity.”146  In order to find inducement, there must be “purposeful, cul-
pable expression and conduct.”147  Justice Souter then listed which 
actions engaged in by Grokster and StreamCast could be sufficient to 
 
 140 Id. at 2778. 
 141 Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2778 (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster Ltd. (Grokster II), 380 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 142 Id. at 2778–79. 
 143 Id. at 2779. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 2780. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2780. 
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constitute intent.148  Justice Souter next explained that actual in-
fringement by others, in addition to intent, is necessary for a finding 
of inducement, and that in this case there was an abundance of evi-
dence to support actual infringement by the users of Grokster and 
StreamCast.149 
III. CONCERNS SPURRED BY THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN 
METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS INC. V. GROKSTER, LTD. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Grokster, 
there are many unanswered questions.  Gary Shapiro, CEO of the 
Consumer Electronics Association described the decision as 
“murky”150 and providing “massive uncertainty.”151  As far as what in-
ducement and infringement mean, Grokster attorney Michael Page 
stated that the decision provides “a whole bunch of conflicting signals 
and standards.”152  Another concern raised is the lack of clarity on 
what constitutes intent,153 and the flood of litigation which could en-
sue.154  Notwithstanding these concerns from the technology side, 
Fred von Lohmann, from the Electronic Frontier Foundation is 
“hopeful that when evidence is presented in the Cal. court, the judge 
should realize that the P2P networks have not violated the Supreme 
Court’s new test.”155 
The most apparent uncertainty to emerge from Grokster is the in-
terpretation of the Sony decision.  While supporters praised the Court 
for affirming the Sony decision,156 the Court actually left that decision 
 
 148 Id. at 2780–82. 
 149 Id. at 2782. 
 150 Paul Sweeting, Supreme Court Hands Hollywood Huge Win in Ruling Against Grok-
ster, Streamcast, VIDEO BUS., July 4, 2005, at 7, available at 2005 WLNR 10640244. 
 151 Andrew Noyes & Greg Piper, High Court Rules Against File-Sharing Networks, 
WASH. INTERNET DAILY, June 28, 2005, available at LEXIS, News Library. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Press Release, Consumer Electronics Assoc., CEA Expresses Concerns over Su-
preme Court Grokster Ruling; Decision Decreases Legal Clarity While Increasing 
Likelihood of Litigation; Intent Test Establishes High Burden for Manufacturers and 
Entrepreneurs (June 28, 2005), available at LEXIS, News Library. 
 154 Jonathan M. Holda, Commentary: Grokster Provides No Bright Line Rule: Welcome 
to Copyright Law, DAILY REC. (Baltimore, MD), July 1, 2005, available at LEXIS, News 
Library. 
 155 High Court Rules Against File-Sharing Networks, CONSUMER ELECTRONICS DAILY, 
June 28, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 10135301. 
 156 Press Release, Home Recording Rights Coalition, HRRC - Concerned Over 
Grokster “Inducement” Rule, Encouraged on Betamax and Home Taping; Intent 
Standard Seems Narrow; Burden of Proof High (June 27, 2005), available at LEXIS, 
News Library. 
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untouched.157  In fact, the unanimous court filed two concurring 
opinions on the issue of the Sony doctrine with three Justices support-
ing each concurrence.158  In Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, in which 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Kennedy join, she was concerned 
with what the Sony Court intended by “substantial noninfringing 
use.”159  Justice Ginsburg did not believe that the “anecdotal evidence 
of noninfringing uses” proffered by Grokster was sufficient to satisfy 
the requirements of Sony.160  Justice Ginsburg emphasized the impor-
tance of the proportion of noninfringing uses to infringing uses, and 
found that one of the reasons the Ninth Circuit was incorrect in its 
analysis of the Sony doctrine was its finding that the noninfringing 
uses that existed for Grokster and StreamCast were substantial.161 
Justice Breyer wrote his concurrence, in which Justice Stevens 
and Justice O’Connor joined, in order to disagree with the concur-
rence of Justice Ginsburg.162  Justice Breyer maintained that the per-
centage of noninfringing use that was necessary in Sony to be consid-
ered substantial was about 9 percent, a figure which is very close to 
the 10 percent he asserted was present in Grokster.163  Justice Breyer 
also stressed the importance of the word “capable” in the Sony deci-
sion, and that the Court did not require the product to currently 
have substantial noninfringing use, but rather that it was capable of 
substantial noninfringing use.164  Justice Breyer utilized the rest of the 
concurrence to explain why altering the Sony rule, as he believes Jus-
tice Ginsburg suggests it ought to be, would be bad from a policy per-
spective.165 
IV. THE APPARENT UNCERTAINTIES RAISED BY THIS DECISION  
ARE RESOLVED IF THE COURTS APPLY THE DECISION IN  
CONJUNCTION WITH PATENT LAW PRINCIPLES 
Most of the concerns regarding the uncertainties of Grokster, in-
cluding those expressed by the Supreme Court, can be resolved by 
looking to patent law where the Court admittedly derived the doc-
trine of inducing infringement.  Additionally, the Supreme Court has 
 
 157 Holda, supra note 154. 
 158 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 125 S. Ct. 
2764, 2769 (2005). 
 159 See id. at 2784 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 160 Id. at 2785. 
 161 Id. at 2785–86. 
 162 Id. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 163 Id. at 2789. 
 164 Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2789 (Breyer J., concurring). 
 165 Id. at 2791–95. 
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acknowledged that when “[t]he closest analogy is provided by the pat-
ent law cases . . . it is appropriate to refer [to them] because of the 
historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.”166  Therefore, 
since Grokster is the first application of inducing infringement in 
copyright law, where the opinion is not explicitly clear, it is appropri-
ate to refer to the application of the inducing infringement of patent 
statute. 
A. Concern over the Murky Standard of What Infringement Means 
There is concern that the Supreme Court was not clear about 
the necessary elements of inducing infringement liability.  Although 
Justice Souter did not explicitly lay out the factors necessary for find-
ing liability, the decision is far from “massive[ly] uncertain[].”167  Jus-
tice Souter’s three page discussion of the evidence which exists 
against Grokster and StreamCast concerning intent,168 as well as his 
use of the phrase “in addition to intent,”169 make it clear that intent is 
a necessary element.  The other required element is “actual in-
fringement by recipients of the device.”170  Regardless of explicit iden-
tification in the decision, Justice Souter declared that the Court was 
adopting the inducing infringement rule from patent law.171  There-
fore, it is appropriate to look to patent law for guidance.  In patent 
law the courts require three elements to be present for a finding of 
inducing infringement: direct infringement, knowledge, and intent.172 
In both patent and copyright law, the requirement of direct in-
fringement is a common element for any finding of secondary liabil-
ity,173 and the courts have read the elements of intent and knowledge 
into the statute, despite an explicit requirement in the Patent Act.174  
In applying the rule presented by the Court in Grokster, the courts will 
require both actual infringement and intent because they are explic-
 
 166 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).  See 
also John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 
137–44 (1991). 
 167 Noyes & Piper, supra note 151. 
 168 Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2780–82. 
 169 Id. at 2782. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 2780. 
 172 CHISUM, supra note 30, § 17.04. 
 173 See supra Part II.A.ii (noting that direct infringement is required for vicarious 
liability and contributory liability in copyright law and for contributory liability and 
inducing infringement in patent law). 
 174 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 
1990); Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988); CHISUM, 
supra note 30, §17.04. 
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itly stated, but the courts should also look to patent law and require 
knowledge. 
In applying § 271(b), the inducing infringement of patent stat-
ute, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recognized that 
“[a]lthough section 271(b) does not use the word ‘knowing,’ the case 
law and legislative history uniformly assert such a requirement,”175 and 
that “a person infringes by actively and knowingly aiding and abetting 
another’s direct infringement.”176  The alleged infringer must have 
knowledge that the acts are inducing infringement; mere knowledge 
of the acts does not sufficiently satisfy the knowledge requirement.177 
When applying the inducing infringement of copyright rule as 
presented by the Supreme Court in Grokster, the courts should adopt 
a knowledge requirement similar to the one adopted by the Federal 
Circuit in patent law.  Reading this requirement in would alleviate 
some fears of murkiness because the courts would recognize, like  
the Federal Circuit, that “[t]he plaintiff has the burden of showing 
that . . . he knew or should have known his actions would induce ac-
tual infringements.”178 
B. Concern that Lack of Clarity of Intent Could Cause Ruinous 
Litigation 
Some critics of the Grokster decision are concerned that the Su-
preme Court was not clear on the standard of intent, and that this 
could lead members of the content industry to bring excessive law-
suits.179  Although the Supreme Court did not devote much time to 
the general standard of intent, Justice Souter made it clear that the 
level of intent necessary is the intent to cause infringement.  Justice 
Souter explained that liability will exist if “one . . .  distributes a de-
vice with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright.”180  
The technology industry should be pleased that the Supreme Court 
established this elevated level of intent because when the courts apply 
 
 175 Water Techs., 850 F.2d at 668 (citing CHISUM, supra note 30, at § 17.04). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1342 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250 
(Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 178 Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
 179 See William Triplett, Grokster Tuned Out, DAILY VARIETY, June 28, 2005, at 1, 
available at 2005 WLNR 10197971. 
 180 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 125 S. Ct. 
2764, 2780 (2005). 
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the inducing infringement statute in patent law, on which this rule is 
based, they do not uniformly apply a high level of intent.181 
In different circumstances, the Federal Circuit applies different 
standards for the requisite level of intent.182  In 1990, the Federal Cir-
cuit held in Manville Sales Corp., that “[i]t must be established that the 
defendant possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringe-
ment.”183  The Federal Circuit has not maintained this high level of 
intent as the standard throughout its decisions.184  In Hewlett-Packard 
Co.,185 which was decided three months prior to Manville Sales Corp., 
the Federal Circuit held the level of intent necessary for inducing in-
fringement is only the “intent to cause the acts which constitute the 
infringement.”186  Since these decisions, the Federal Circuit has util-
ized both specific intent to induce infringement,187 and the lower 
standard which is intent to cause the act that constitutes infringe-
ment.188 
While it is clear that the level of intent necessary for a finding of 
inducing infringement of a copyright is high, there is still concern 
over how a court will determine whether intent is present.  The Su-
preme Court did spend time describing the specific activity engaged 
in by Grokster and StreamCast that it felt displayed the necessary in-
tent.189  In addition, Justice Souter listed which activities would not be 
sufficient, such as mere knowledge of the infringement, as well as 
“ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering cus-
tomers technical support or product updates.”190  The Supreme Court 
also held that intent may be shown through clear expression.  The 
Court provided substantial guidance on how to determine what con-
stitutes intent, but also intentionally left it somewhat undefined.  The 
Supreme Court allowed for “other affirmative steps taken to foster in-
 
 181 CHISUM, supra note 30, § 17.04. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 553.  “Specific Intent” is defined as “[t]he intent to 
accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later charged with.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 826 (8th ed. 2004). 
 184 CHISUM, supra note 30, § 17.04. 
 185 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 186 Id. at 1469. 
 187 Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1342 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 188 Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 189 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 125 S. Ct. 
2764, 2780–82 (2005). 
 190 Id. at 2780. 
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fringement.”191  This standard is similar to the standard used in evalu-
ating liability for inducing infringement of a patent, where the courts 
may infer intent.192  Permitting a court to infer intent grants more 
discretion to the courts and allows a more fact sensitive analysis. 
The ability to infer intent does not mean courts have no guid-
ance, they may look to patent law where there is precedent for infer-
ring intent.  In patent law it is not necessary to have direct evidence 
in order to prove inducement, but rather “circumstantial evidence 
may suffice,”193 and “[t]he requisite intent to induce infringement 
may be inferred from all of the circumstances.”194  The Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit has established guidelines for inferring 
intent.195 
One of these guidelines is the requirement of an affirmative 
act.196  In Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co., Ltd.,197 a parent company es-
caped liability for a subsidiary’s infringement because the Federal 
Circuit held that failure to prevent infringement was not induce-
ment.198  The Federal Circuit stated that “[i]n the absence of a show-
ing of control over another party, merely permitting that party to 
commit infringing acts does not constitute infringement,”199 and “evi-
dence of mere inaction [does] not constitute inducement.”200  The 
 
 191 Id. 
 192 Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 669 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 193 Id. at 668. 
 194 Id. at 669.  The Federal Circuit applied this standard in Snuba International, Inc. 
v. Dolphin World, Inc., No. 99-1357, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16946, at *18 (Fed. Cir. July 
11, 2000).  Snuba owned a patent for a method for diving without air tanks strapped 
to the body.  Id. at *2.  Dolphin World manufactured air tanks that were not strapped 
to the body.  Dolphin World provided promotional material containing instructions 
on how to use its product in a way consistent with the method for which Snuba 
owned a patent, and thus, was infringing.  Id. at *2–3.  The Federal Circuit consid-
ered instructions on how to infringe, although supplied separately from the product, 
in combination with supplying the product, sufficient to infer the necessary intent 
for inducing infringement liability.  Id. at *18. 
 195 CHISUM, supra note 30, § 17.04[3]. 
 196 See Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co., Ltd., 248 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
 197 248 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  Tegal had an injunction against Tokyo Elec-
tron America, Inc. (TEA), preventing the corporation from inducing its subsidiaries 
to infringe Tegal’s patents.  Id. at 1377.  After the injunction had issued, one of the 
companies that TEA owned directly infringed one of Tegal’s patents, and Tegal 
claimed that this violated the injunction because TEA induced.  Id.  Since TEA did 
not take any action to get the subsidiary to infringe, the court did not infer intent.  
Id. at 1380. 
 198 Id. at 1380. 
 199 Id. at 1378. 
 200 Tegal, 248 F.3d at 1379 (citing A. Stucki Co. v. Worthington Indus., Inc., 849 
F.2d 593, 597 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
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Federal Circuit noted that a defendant cannot be held liable for fail-
ure to take legal action against the party it is allegedly inducing.201  In 
Tegal, the Federal Circuit held that in order to find a defendant liable 
for inducing infringement, the defendant must commit an affirma-
tive act.202 
Another patent case that is helpful in determining the presence 
of intent is Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Industries, 
Inc.203  In that case, advertising satisfied the requirement of an af-
firmative step to infer intent.204  In Chiuminatta, the court found the 
manufacturers of a saw liable for inducing infringement of a patent 
by inferring intent through advertisement.205  Since the saw could per-
form an infringing function and the advertisement notified the con-
sumers of this fact, the court found Cardinal liable for inducing in-
fringement.206  If a manufacturer conveys to the consumer the 
possible infringing use of either an infringing or an innocent prod-
uct, through advertising, labels, or instructions, he could be held li-
able for inducing infringement of a patent.207  Donald S. Chisum, a 
leading authority on patents, noted that “[e]ven an express warning 
to customers against infringing use will not preclude liability if under 
the circumstances the warning invites such use.”208 
If a court interpreting the new inducing infringement of copy-
right rule adopts these limitations on inferring intent, it would mini-
mize the concern over frivolous litigation.  A copyright holder would 
have an indication by looking at patent law of what may or may not 
constitute the requisite intent for infringement, and would only in-
vest in lawsuits where a court is likely to find inducement. 
C. The Fate of the Sony Decision 
In Grokster, a case concerned with establishing a new standard of 
liability in copyright law, much is made by the Justices of what should 
 
 201 Id. at 1380. 
 202 Id. at 1378, 1380. 
 203 145 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 204 Id. at 1312. 
 205 Id.  In this case, Cardinal manufactured a saw that cut through concrete, while 
Chiuminatta held a patent for the process of cutting through concrete at a certain 
hardness.  Id. at 1305–06.  In advertisements by Cardinal, it informed customers that 
they could use the saw to cut through concrete at a hardness that the patent did not 
protect.  Id.  Cardinal conceded, however, that the saw would cut through that level 
and beyond, therefore encompassing the hardness the patent protected.  Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 CHISUM, supra note 30, §17.04[4][F]. 
 208 Id. 
KEEGAN FINAL.DOC 3/7/2006  4:31:03 PM 
1038 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1015 
be done with an old rule of copyright law.  Both the new standard, 
inducing infringement, and the old rule, the staple-article doctrine 
from the Sony decision, are ideas borrowed from patent law.  It ap-
pears the Justices’ concerns are unnecessary. 
Patent law has proven not only that the staple-article doctrine 
and the concept of inducing infringement are capable of coexist-
ing,209 but that the staple-article doctrine provides an appropriate 
limitation on secondary liability.  The language that the Supreme 
Court adopted in the Sony decision was taken directly from 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(c), the contributory infringement section of the Patent Act, 
which is immediately preceded by § 271(b), the inducing infringe-
ment section of the Patent Act, which the Court adopted in the Grok-
ster decision.210 
Justice Souter described the current understanding of the Sony 
rule as limiting “imputing culpable intent as a matter of law from the 
characteristics or uses of a distributed product.”211  This means that if 
a product is capable of a noninfringing use, and there is no other 
evidence that the distributor was intending to induce infringement, 
the distributor cannot be liable.212  The application of the Sony rule by 
Justice Souter is the application of the staple-article doctrine that the 
Federal Circuit utilizes. 
There are several cases in patent law which demonstrate that the 
current application of the staple-article doctrine, in conjunction with 
the inducing infringement rule, is successful in catching infringers, 
while still being effective in limiting liability to manufactures which 
intend to induce infringement.  The Federal Circuit, in Fina Research, 
S.A. v. Baroid Ltd.,213 makes it clear that even if a product is deemed a 
staple article, that does not explicitly provide protection from induc-
ing infringement liability.214  In its analysis, the Federal Circuit ac-
 
 209 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). 
 210 Id. 
 211 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 125 S. Ct. 
2764, 2779 (2005). 
 212 See id. 
 213 141 F.3d 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 214 Id. at 1482.  Fina was a chemical company that made and sold FINAGREEN, a 
product used in drilling for oil and as an ingredient in drilling muds.  Id. at 1480.  
Baroid owned the patent for these drilling muds and claimed that Fina infringed and 
induced infringement of its patent because customers that used FINAGREEN to 
make the drilling muds infringed the patent.  Id.  The court held that Fina could be 
held liable for inducing infringement, but not for direct infringement because, at 
most, FINAGREEN satisfied only one element of the drilling mud patents, which 
contained multi-element claims.  Id. at 1481–82.  Further, the court explained that 
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knowledged that with inducing infringement, the fact that the in-
fringing article is a “staple article or commodity of commerce suitable 
for substantial noninfringing use”215 does not protect the defendant 
from liability.216  Despite the fact that a staple-article is not completely 
insulated from liability, it still protects legitimate manufacturers. 
In Oak Industries, Inc. v. Zenith Electronics Corp.,217 the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois examined 
the liability of a manufacturer whose product had several uses, all of 
which were noninfringing except one.218  The court found that in a 
case such as this, whether or not the manufacturer is liable for induc-
ing infringement hinges on whether or not the requisite level of in-
tent is present.219  The court noted that “a jury could find that Zenith 
actually induced infringement . . . by adding extra shielding . . . to 
eliminate direct pickup interference;”220 however, “if the jury found 
that the shielding was necessary for the converters to perform the 
unpatented methods, then any infringement would be incidental to 
the performance of other functions,”221 and Zenith would not be li-
able.  If the product is a staple-article and its capacity to infringe a 
copyright is incidental and necessary to its ability to perform its other 
noninfringing functions, the intent element for inducing infringe-
ment will not be met, and there can be no liability.222 
 
because FINAGREEN was capable of a noninfringing use, Fina could not be held li-
able for contributory infringement.  Id. 
 215 Fina Research, 141 F.3d at 1482–83 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)). 
 216 Id. at 1482. 
 217 726 F. Supp. 1525 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
 218 Id. at 1539–44.  Zenith created a cable converter box that performed several 
functions such as tuning, decoding, and descrambling.  Id. at 1529.  The housing 
around the box had a shielding that prevented direct interference, a method pat-
ented by Oak Industries.  Id.  Zenith argued that the converter boxes used the same 
hardware to perform the infringing function of preventing interference and nonin-
fringing function of housing the box, and that the infringement was not intentional.  
Id. at 1538. 
 219 Id. at 1542. 
 220 Oak Indus., 726 F. Supp. at 1542 n.12. 
 221 Id. at 1542. 
 222 See id. 
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Additionally, in Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp.,223 the drug 
company was not liable when two percent of consumers used the 
drug in an infringing manner while the remaining ninety-eight per-
cent did not infringe.224  The Federal Circuit held that “[e]specially 
where a product has substantial noninfringing uses, intent to induce 
infringement cannot be inferred even when the defendant has actual 
knowledge that some users of its product may be infringing the pat-
ent.”225 
When analyzing the Sony rule and what its current and future 
application should be, the courts should look to patent law.  There, 
an exact determination of what amount of noninfringing use consti-
tutes a substantial amount, which is the focus of both concurrences in 
Grokster, is not the important aspect of the doctrine.  What the staple-
article doctrine brings to patent law, and what the Sony rule brings to 
copyright law, is a check on the ability of the courts to presume in-
tent.  Under the current understanding, the exact percentage of use 
that is noninfringing is irrelevant as long as there is other evidence of 
intent to induce infringement. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Grokster, copyright law 
permitted two ways to hold a defendant liable for infringement by 
another: vicarious and contributory liability.226  The courts were un-
successful in utilizing either form of secondary liability to hold the 
current peer-to-peer file-sharing networks liable for the infringement 
of users.227  Congress introduced the “Inducing Infringement of 
Copyright Act of 2004” as an alternative means of secondary liability 
to hold peer-to-peer networks liable.228  Unfortunately the congres-
sional session expired before any action was taken on the bill.229  On 
 
 223 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  Apotex is a drug company that owned patents 
for various uses of its drugs.  Id. at 1351–53.  A small percentage of doctors began 
prescribing one of Apotex’s drugs for a use in a way that not only differed from a 
method for which Apotex owned a patent, but also infringed a Warner-Lambert pat-
ent.  Id.  The court held that although Apotex may have known about the infringing 
use, the use was not approved by the FDA, it was only used in an infringing way about 
two percent of the time, and therefore, the evidence was insufficient to infer intent.  
Id. at 1365–66. 
 224 Id. at 1365. 
 225 Id. 
 226 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 227 See supra Part II.D. 
 228 See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text. 
 229 See supra note 126–27 and accompanying text. 
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June 27, 2005 the Supreme Court issued a decision in Grokster, in 
which it adopted liability for inducing infringement of a copyright.230 
The Supreme Court’s decision received criticism for lacking clar-
ity.231  Many of the uncertainties could be resolved by examining the 
decision in conjunction with the previously established principles of 
inducing infringement in patent law, since that is where the Supreme 
Court admittedly borrows the doctrine.232  Criticism that the Supreme 
Court was too vague, in regard to the exact requirements of induce-
ment and infringement, can be resolved through an analysis of Jus-
tice Souter’s decision in its entirety, as well as looking to patent law 
which established direct infringement, intent, and knowledge as the 
necessary requirements.233  The concern over the lack of clarity of 
what constitutes intent can be resolved by recognizing the guidance 
Justice Souter provides, by listing specific activities which are not suf-
ficient to constitute intent, as well as looking at patent law cases in 
which the Federal Circuit provides further guidelines for finding in-
tent.234  The disagreement among the Justices concerning the fate of 
the Sony decision can also be resolved by looking to patent law, from 
which the Sony decision was originally borrowed, and where the sta-
ple-article doctrine and inducing infringement rule coexist.235 
 
 
 230 See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
 231 See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text. 
 232 See supra Part IV.A–B. 
 233 See supra Part IV.A. 
 234 See supra Part IV.B. 
 235 See supra Part IV.C. 
